How May the Disposition of Personal Injury Litigation be Improved? by Richardson, James R.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 52 | Issue 3 Article 3
1964
How May the Disposition of Personal Injury
Litigation be Improved?
James R. Richardson
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Litigation Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richardson, James R. (1964) "How May the Disposition of Personal Injury Litigation be Improved?," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 52 :
Iss. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol52/iss3/3
How May the Disposition of
Personal Injury Litigation
be Improved?
By JAMES R. RIcaAmDsON*
I. OBJECTnvS OF TM PARTICMANTS
Improvement in the disposition of personal injury litigation is
interwoven with the legitimate objectives of individuals and
groups having an interest in such actions. They are: the judges,
parties, attorneys and society.
Judges must have as their objectives the orderly administration
of justice, maintenance of judicial integrity and rendition of sound
decisions. Trial judges should maintain judicial decorum, display
legal acumen, accord trial participants that degree of courtesy
which they merit and rule soundly and impartially. Appellate
judges must study briefs with care and listen to oral arguments
with tolerant understanding. Frequently, appellate judges must
make policy decisions rather than interpret rules of law. What-
ever the task, be it policy or rule of law, the judges must visualize
paper facts, paper litigants and paper witnesses as real and living.
In so doing, they will breathe life into paper cases and reach
decisions which reflect the objectives of society, not those of the
judges. Judges can do much to improve the disposition of
personal injury litigation.
It is realistic, not cynical, to assume that the injured plaintiff
has as his objective as large a verdict as will be sustained upon
appeal. This will be concurred in by the plaintiffs attorney. At
the other extreme, the defendant and his attorney will strive for
as favorable a verdict as will withstand the scrutiny of appellate
review.
These opposites are the result of party presentation of evi-
dence under adversary trial procedure. Party presentation is
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
PERsoNAL INJURY LITIGATION
based on the theory that, from exaggerated and conflicting
versions of facts, the true facts can be ascertained by trial judges.
Consequently, each litigant is concerned with creating a highly
favorable climate for his claim or defense. These objectives are
inherent in jury trials. Elimination is impractical, but objectives
can be controlled by proper techniques. This must be done unless
personal injury litigation is to remain one phase of tort law in
which reasonable predictability is to be sacrificed for a legal
gamble on the big verdict.
The public interest is more complex than private interests in
personal injury litigation. Society finds it desirable that its mem-
bers realize their objectives, subject to paramount considerations
of the general welfare. And, recognizing the many conflicts of
public and private interests, society has erected intricate and
costly judicial structures for settling individual controversies
within the confines of the public interest.' To this end, courts
seek to award prompt and just compensation to one who has been
injured by the wrongful act of another. This protects the injured
person from unwarranted economic loss, and may prevent him
and his dependents from becoming public charges to the detri-
ment of society. On the other hand, society does not use its
courts to punish a defendant for a civil wrong, except in awarding
punitive damages. Rather, its purpose is pecuniary reparation
for civil wrongs. Hence, society finds it undesirable that a
defendant be ruined financially by a verdict in personal injury
litigation. We conclude that the objective of society in these
cases is prompt and just compensation to the plaintiff without
economic ruin to the defendant.
II. MEDIUM FOR AcIHEVRNG OBJECTIVES
If we are assured that the defendant, if liable, can satisfy a
verdict without financial disaster, the duel objectives of prompt
and just compensation remain as troublesome problems. There
can be little doubt that results in personal injury actions are sel-
dom prompt and not always just. It is common knowledge that in
lIt costs about $45,000,000 a year to operate the federal courts. It is
estimated that it requires about $500,000,000 annually to operate the state courts.
Together they handle billions of dollars in civil litigation and adjudicate vital
rights of many people. Burger, The Courts on Trial: A Call for Action Against
Delay, 44 A.B.A.J. 788, 789 (1958).
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some metropolitan areas there are backlogs of civil cases that
have been on file from five to seven years.2 Undue delay can lead
to compromise settlements for less than what claims are actually
worth; and much of this delay is attributable to jury trials.3 Next,
the lack of uniformity in jury verdicts is indicative of injustice
rather than fair compensation.4 Trial attorneys know why these
discrepancies exist. The significant reasons are:
1. A jury tries only one case so it has no precedents to follow,
2. Jury verdicts are higher against corporate defendants,
3. Experienced negligence lawyers secure larger verdicts
than general practitioners, and
4. Differences of opinion as to the measure of damages.
With respect to differences of opinion, one court stated:
The measure of damages for personal injuries is the amount
which will compensate for all detriment proximately caused by
the defendant's negligence and it must be reasonable, but what
is reasonable is a question upon which there may legiti-
mately be a wide difference of opinion.5
2 "The inordinate lapse of time between the institution of suits and their
final disposition in many of our state and federal courts constitutes a threat to the
effective administration of justice in this country.... Prolonged and unjustified
delay is the major weakness of our judicial system today." Ibid.3 Shulman & Clark, Jury Trials in Civil Cases, 43 Yale L.J. 867 (1934).
From a survey of 23,349 jury and non-jury civil cases tried over a period of
twenty years, Dean Shulman and Professor Clark list statistical data to buttress
their conclusion that the trial jury is an expensive, cumbersome and comparatively
inefficient trial device. They also state that the record of appeals and reversals
weighs heavily against jury trials.4 In Feldman v. Feldman, 206 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1960), an award of $200,000
to a twenty-seven year old unmarried bookkeeper, who was earning $68 per week
was held to be fair and reasonable. The injuries consisted of a broken neck,
which required lengthy hospitalization, and a broken leg, all of which were
permanently disabling. This may have been a fair award, but at the other
extreme a verdit of $15,000 for a nineteen year old highway surveyor for
permanent injury to the back and spine, which required him to sleep on a hard
surface to avoid further pain and injury was held neither inadequate nor excessive.
Myers v. Pearce, 115 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. App. 1960).
In another personal injury case, an award by the jury of $90,000 to a forty-
four year old common laborer for the loss of the left hand above the wrist was
held not excessive on appeal, despite the fact that the period of hospitalization
was short and medical hills were small. Pischilto v. Waldron, 158 A.2d 168
(Conn. 1961). This verdict appears fair on its face but contrasts sharply with a
case in which the plaintiff suffered a brain injury, loss of hearing, continuing
headaches, bursitis, pain and tenderness in his left hand and elbow, with
evidence that his condition would probably not improve and a 30% chance
that he would develope epilepsy. The jury verdict was for only $6,791.02,
despite a showing of special damages in the amount of $3,767.02. Ha v. Murphy,
9 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Cal. App. 1960).
5 Eggink v. Robertson, 13 Cal. Rptr. 76 (Cal. App. 1961).
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This statement is an attempted defense of discrepancies in
jury verdicts and is, in itself, indefensible. Different juries may
differ widely on the issue of reasonable compensation, but this is
a weakness and not a display of strength to be labeled legitimate.
If the jury system does not function effectively in personal
injury cases, is it to be discarded?6 This we would advocate and
propose as a plan for administrative tribunals,r but the trial jury
is too firmly entrenched for abrupt change. This observation is
buttressed by a case in which the defendant claimed there had
been a waiver by failure to make a demand for a jury trial under
the civil rules.8 But the trial court, in granting plaintiff's motion
on the day the case was set for trial, stated, "a personal injury
action arising from an automobile accident is purely and simply
a case triable by a jury." The reviewing court adopted this view
upon appeal. And, accepting the trial jury as a "fixture" in per-
sonal injury litigation, we turn our attention to suggestions which
will further the attainment of legitimate objectives in such cases.
A. Changes with Reference to Damages and Fees
1. Proof of Financial Responsibility
The problem of the financially irresponsible motorist is an
increasingly vexing one on a national scale. Legislative attempts
to meet the problem may be classified as:
a. Security-type safety responsibility laws,'
6The seeming impossibility of disposing of more than a slight fraction of
all litigation in Massachusetts by means of trial jury has led at least one member
of its bar to prophesy that "the trial jury will pass of its own accord." Letter
from Dunbar F. Carpenter, reported in 15 A.B.A.J. 581 (1929).7 After extended study a distinguished committee suggested some years ago
that compensation for automobile accidents be removed from the sphere of
litigation and be administered by an administrative tribunal, on the basis of
liability regardless of fault, in the manner in which compensation for industrial
accidents is administered. Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for
Automobile Accidents (1931); French, The Automobile Compensation Plan
(1933). See Massachusetts Judicial Council, 8th Report 22 (1932).
8Price v. Bates, 320 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1959). The rules involved were Ky.
Civ. Rules 38.02 and 38.04, which provide that a jury trial is waived by failure
to demand it within ten days from the filing of the last pleading. These rules
are the same as Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b) and 38(d).
9 Such laws have been enacted in more than forty states. They provide for
posting of security after an accident by the motor vehicle owner, whether at fault
or not, to cover damages, and to provide proof of financial security in the future,
within a stated period after an accident, or suffer suspension of his license and
registration.
1964]
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b. Financial responsibility laws,1"
c. Automobile compensation plans,1
d. Unsatisfied judgment funds, 2 and
e. Compulsory liability insurance.13
The majority of states have statutes which apply sanctions
after an accident so the motorist, like the common law dog, has
one free accident. The New York and Massachusetts laws provide
adequate protection. Under these laws, no vehicle may be
registered except with proof of financial responsibility as shown
by:
a. Liability insurance which must be kept in force during
the period of registration, or
b. A financial security bond, or
c. A financial security deposit in the amount of $25,000, or
d. Qualification as a self-insurer under the act.
A motor vehicle on crowded highways of today is a dangerous
instrumentality in the hands of irresponsible drivers. Proof of
financial responsibility of all drivers is long overdue. A desirable
by-product is that it will keep reckless drivers off the roads be-
cause of uninsurability.
2. Statutory Limitations on Recovery
Soaring verdicts in person injury litigation under the theory
of the "adequate award" need to be checked as a demonstration
of 'legal sanity" if nothing else. 4 These verdicts reflect:
10 These laws are now obsolete except in Kansas and South Carolina. They
provide that when a judgment against a financially irresponsible driver remains
unsatisfied for a stated period, the license and registration of such person shall
be suspended until the judgment is satisfied, and proof of financial responsibility
for the future is shown.
11 The theory of this plan is similar to that of workmen's compensation, in
that the common law rule of liability based on negligence is not applicable. Upon
payment of the required premium, the motorist not only becomes insured himself,
but insures any person he may injure regardless of fault.
12Sc funds are now in effect in New Jersey and North Dakota. Generally,
funds of this kind are financed by additional taxes on resident motorists, or by
assessing insurance companies doing business within the state.
13 Compulsory liability insurance plans are in effect in Massachusetts and
New York. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 90, §§ 34A-34J; ch. 175, §§ 93-93K. N.Y.
Vehicle and Traffic Laws, §§ 93-93K. See Compulsory Automobile Liability In-
surance in New York, 26 Fordham L. Rev. 170 (1958).
14 Examples of large verdicts: A railroad foreman suffered the loss of both
legs by amputation as a result of infection caused by insect bites while at work.
(Continued on next page)
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a. The devalued dollar and inflationary trends,
b. Plaintiffs' attorney specialists who emphasize damages,
c. Appeals to the sympathy and prejudice of jurors, and
d. Plain old "deep pocket" digging.
We do not suggest statutory limitations on elements of
compensatory damages, but allowances for such parasitic elements
of harm as insult, humiliation and pain have become exorbitant
and should be curbed. Pain and suffering should bear some
logical relation to compensatory damages, but presently, awards
for pain not infrequently exceed compensatory damages. 15 Stat-
utes should fix an arbitrary ceiling for pain and suffering awards,
or limit them to a fixed per cent of compensatory awards.
3. Punitive Damages
Although only four states, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska
and Washington, reject the doctrine of punitive damages, it is
unsound. It becomes increasingly unsound under currently large
personal injury verdicts. An early United States Supreme Court
explained the doctrine in these words:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in
actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury
may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive
damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of
his offense rather than the measure of compensation to the
plaintiff.16
Courts flatly state, "Punitive damages are for punishment."lT
In a recent action for personal injuries suffered in an automobile
accident, the jury awarded $37,500 compensatory and $20,000
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
The jury verdict was $625,000, with $270,000 of this amount being for pain and
suffering. On appeal the case was reversed on the ground of no liability under
the F.E.L.A. Gallick v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 173 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio App. 1961).
In another case a jockey, thrown while exercising a horse, suffered permanent
brain stem injuries and multiple fractures. The verdict was $450,000. The case
may be on appeal. Billington v. California Jockey Club (Super. Ct. San Francisco,
Cal. 1961). Verdict of $454,860 for personal injuries in Beal v. Southern Union
Gas Co., 66 N.M. 424, 349 P.2d 337 (1960). Verdict of $288,022 for personal
injuries in Lehmuth v. Long Beach Unified School District, 53 Cal. 2d 544, 348
P.2d 887 (1960).
15 Jury award of $121,000 for loss of earning power and $127,439 for pain
and suffering. Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955).
16 Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 14 L. Ed. 181 (1851).
17 State ex rel Boswell v. Curtis, 334 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. App. 1960).
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punitive damages.' On appeal, the verdict was affirmed with the
court stressing that the defendant was driving while intoxicated.
The verdict reflects jury prejudice which should be demonstrated,
if at all, in a prosecution for the offense. The reason for punitive
damages is in conflict with the compensatory theory of damages.
If a defendant is to be punished, it should be done in a criminal
prosecution in which he has the benefit of many protective rules
of procedure.
4. Contingent Fees
Abuses in personal injury litigation have led to criticism and
a lessening of public confidence in attorneys and the courts. The
tremendous increase in these cases has led to ambulance chasing,
false promises, filing of unjust claims and unpredictability in
verdicts. The lure of the big contingent fee is responsible for
much of this abuse. It is defended on the ground that otherwise
meritorious claimants might be denied their day in court through
inability to employ an attorney. This argument may have merit,
but it can be argued that the contingent fee is unprofessional,
promotes litigation and is detrimental to the ends of justice.
These ends would be furthered if contingent fees were subjected
to reasonable control. With verdicts in personal injury actions
ranging from $300,000 to $600,000, the contingent fee which
varies from twenty-five to fifty per cent becomes distorted and
oppressive.19
With state and local associations policing their own groups,
proper controls can be instituted. Maximum fee schedules should
be adopted in cases with verdicts exceeding $100,000. As an
alternative, boards of attorneys in local bar associations could
review such cases to determine if the fees were reasonable. Such
control would strengthen public confidence in the legal profession,
but it is necessary that it be self-initiated as courts probably lack
the power to regulate attorneys' fees.20
18 Smith v. McNulty, 293 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1961). In upholding the puni-
tive damages award, the court noted that the defendant was intoxicated and
driving at a high rate of speed when he struck the plaintiff's car from the rear.
The court also noted that the defendant tried to leave the scene of the accident
and resisted arrest. This post-accident conduct was not relevant in the civil action,
and should have been punished in an action by the state.
19 See cases cited in note 14, supra.20 In an action by attorneys against the justices of the appellate division of
the supreme court in the first judicial department to determine if the defendants
(Continued on next page)
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B. Jury Trial Procedures
1. Juror Exemptions and Pay
Statutes in many jurisdictions eliminate too many qualified
jurors.21 If statutes are modernized to open jury service to all
occupations and professions, they usually place exemption from
service within the discretion of the trial judge.22 This places
undue pressure on judges, who look to voters to return them to
office, with the result that many good prospective jurors never
serve. It must be conceded that the average juror is better
qualified than ever before, but more improvement would come
with fewer exemptions and adequate pay.
Jury duty can be regarded as a public duty, but this is not
true in civil cases. These jurors should receive adequate pay for
their time, with the pay being taxed as costs to the party who
demands the 'luxury" of a jury trial.2 3 This procedure would lead
to waiver of jury trial in some cases and to compromises in others.
It is well known that many cases should never be tried, and trial
jurors often express this opinion after serving at a civil term of
court. The urge of the attorney with a weak case to avoid a
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
had the constitutional or statutory power to enact a rule which established a
scale of fees in personal injury and wrongful death cases, the New York Supreme
Court held that the power was lacking. The court said that courts d-o not
regulate attorneys in the sense that it supervises them in their office transactions,
and the matter of fixing fees is generally a matter of agreement between attorney
and client. But courts have the power to discipline an attorney if a fee is
unconscionable, or if advantage is taken of the ignorance of a client. Gair v.
Peck, 165 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1957).
21 The following is a typical juror exemption statute:
All governmental officers and judges, physicians, osteopaths, dentists,
teachers and school officials, locomotive engineers, keepers of public mills
and ferries, bank tellers and cashiers, ministers of the gospel and Jewish
rabbis, officers of the United States government, lawyers, telegraph
operators, one apothecary in every drug store, and members of fire and
police departments shall be exempt from serving as jurors.
Miss. Code, Vol. 2, § 1764 (1963).22 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 29.035: "Only those who, in the sound discretion of the
court, are entitled to exemption shall be exempt from service on any grand or
petit j*ry."
MJuirors average being paid about $5 per day in the various states. In
some states a small fee is taxed as costs to the party demanding jury trial. Va. Code,
§ 8-204-Jurors receive $3.50 per diem and seven cents per mile for transportation.
Utah Code Anno. § 21-5-12-Party desiring jury trial in civil case must deposit $5
as costs with the clerk; § 21-5-1-Jurors to be paid $4 per day for attendance on
court. Okla. Stat. Anno. Tit. 38, § 32-Jurors are paid $5 per diem and mileage
at rate of five cents. In Vermont the pay is a bit better. $10 is taxed as costs
for each action tried by a jury and jurors are paid $10 per day for attendance.
Vt. Stat. Anno. Tit. 32, §§ 1471 (4), 1511.
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directed verdict would be curbed by the client who had to "pay
the freight."
2. Trial Jury Handbooks
It has been aptly stated that no litigant has a right, constitu-
tional or otherwise, to have his case tried before ignorant jurors. 4
It has also been held that a party is entitled to a jury free from
prejudice to his cause, and competent as well.2 5 These decisions,
taken together, make a strong case for trial jury handbooks, which
serve to enlighten jurors on their duties and on court procedure.
This suggestion is not an innovation. Jury handbooks have
been used in some federal and state courts, but have met with
opposition at times. In one case the court said that erroneous
information in a jury booklet constituted an impingement on the
right to a fair trial .2  But this problem should not be present in
civil cases, particularly if the handbook is carefully drafted. A
handbook that describes the functions of jurymen in a clear and
concise manner will aid jurors in making their contributions to
the administration of justice.
8. Jury Selections-Voir Dire
The attorney in a civil action does not select the judge to try
his case, but is permitted to select the jury through a "selection
by rejection" process called voir dire. Voir dire examination is
traditional rather than rational. At common law a defendant
could produce oath helpers or compurgators to purge him of debt.
Under historically dim transition, whereby compurgators who
knew the facts (de visu et audita) became jurors who knew of the
facts, it is not surprising that the parties retained a right to
participate in their selection. But this feudal relic is a time
consuming and costly process that emphasizes the adversary
nature of trials. It is unrealistic in that attorneys ostensibly seek
impartial jurors when actually they hope for favorable jurors. In
cases of significance, jury panels are exhausted with voir dire
examinations running into days.
24 People v. Izzo, 151 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 1958).
25 Casey v. Archbishop of Baltimore, 143 A.2d 627 (Md. 1958).26 United States v. Gordon, 196 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1952). Upon a second
trial and appeal, the court stated that what is said about the jury booklet upon
the first appeal was dicta, thus leaving its status in doubt.
[Vol. 52,
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Prospective jurors, with statutory qualifications, should be
given questionnaires to answer in advance of a trial to which
they were to be assigned. This would be done on the basis of
the names of the parties and attorneys, and a brief factual state-
ment of the case. The court would use the questionnaires to
select an impartial jury, and challenges would be limited to
fraud or mistake. The adoption of this simplified process in lieu
of a decadent, dramatically staged procedure would add reason
and stature to civil trials.
4. Limiting Use of Demonstrative Evidence
Demonstrative evidence that aids juries in fact-finding serves
a legitimate purpose in the courtroom. Visual impressions can
give clarity to verbalization. But demonstrative evidence that
is used to arouse jury sympathy and prejudice should be barred
from trials. Emphasis on new techniques in personal injury cases
during the past two decades has led to the use of maps, models,
cases, blackboards, enlarged photographs, skeletons and demon-
strations on a large scale in courtrooms. The result in many
instances has been the substitution of a carnival atmosphere for
the dignity of the courtroom.28 In turn, aroused juries respond
with large verdicts that require reversal for excessiveness of
damages.29
Courts in permitting the use of demonstrative evidence should
ascertain that it has a legitimate purpose and is not calculated to
unduly arouse the emotions of jurors. Further, they should dis-
27Under Fed. R. Civ. 47(a), voir dire examination may be:
a. exclusively by the court,
b. exclusively by the parties, or
c. by the court and the parties.
This rule could be invoked in the federal courts and the approximately
twenty-five states that have the federal rules to drastically curtail voir dire
examination.2 8 In view of the extreme lengths to which some current practice has gone
in the use of visual material to dramatize and emotionalize the presentation of
cases, the existence of discretionary control may be needed to prevent abuse of a
technique which used with due restraint is a valuable aid to the administration
of justice. See McCormick, Evidence, § 180 (1954).29 The maimed, the widow, and the orphan draw strongly enough on the
hearts of jurymen without affirmative effort to arouse sympathy. Human
nature needs no artificial aid in this respect. Would it be allowable to
strike a sensitive wound, in order that the jury might hear the plaintiff
scream with pain? What restraint would there be on opportunity for
simulated evidence?
Willis v. City of Browning, 161 Mo. App. 461, 148 S.W. 516 (1912).
1964]
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tinguish between real evidence that is original, in that it is directly
connected with the transaction in issue, and prepared evidence,
such as sketches, models and casts. The latter may be irrelevant
and inflammatory. The former is always relevant, but may be
incompetent because inflammatory.
5. Trial Jury Precedents
This suggestion is an innovation. It would receive opposition
but it makes sense. Courts have precedents to follow, but not
juries which render only one verdict. Courts in passing on the
issue of inadequate or excessive damages know amounts that
have been condemned or approved in the past. But jury-made
law is peculiar in form. It makes no general pronouncements. It
is not codified or embodied in any precedents. This is so because
each jury makes its own law in each case with little knowledge
as to what has been done in the past or will be done in the future
in similar cases.2 0 Judges, in reviewing the issue of damages, think
in terms of verdicts in other cases, but this right is not accorded
to juries. Why shouldn't juries know the verdicts of juries in other
cases which have received judicial approval? This could prevent
reversals on the issue of damages.
In some respects items of damages are personal to plaintiffs,
but in some respects they are, or should be, standardized. It is
illogical for X to get $10,000 for pain and suffering from a
sprained back while Y gets $1,000. It is illogical for X to get
$20,000 punitive damages for being struck by a drunken driver
while Y gets $1,000. These items of damages can be standardized
to some extent. When the similarity of cases justifies the action,
juries should be advised in instructions what other juries have
done in the past-not as arbitrary standards, but as flexible guides.
6. Instructing Trial Juries
There has been much critical commentary on instructing lay
juries as to technical legal issues. This criticism is justified, but it
should also be directed at judges and attorneys who complicate
the problem with numerous and confusing instructions. Time and
again appellate courts complain, but with little success.31 And
30 See Frank, Law and the Modem Mind 174 (1930).31
"Although the issues in the instant case were few and simple the trial
court was called upon to pass on 22 separate instructions, of which 14 were given
to the jury. We can see no sound reason for so many requested instructions."
(Continued on next page)
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reversals on erroneous instructions continue to plague courts and
litigants.32
Instructions present a peculiarly acute problem in automobile
collision cases. For instance, a standard statutory provision re-
quires a motorist approaching an intersection which has no stop
signs or signals to yield to any vehicle approaching from his right.
The statute appears clear and simple but decisions fail to sub-
stantiate this conclusion. Courts build up a complicated formula
in instructions under which the speed of the vehicles, their
relative distances from the intersection, visibility, condition of the
road and all the surrounding circumstances must be taken into
consideration. And in most accident litigation juries are given
charges and counter-charges on negligence, contributory negli-
gence, proximate cause, last clear chance, sudden emergency and
unavoidable accident, to mention a few relevant doctrinal con-
cepts.
One would think that the 'law of the road" would be fairly
simple. But in nearly a half-century of such litigation, the law
has become more complicated as accident rates increase and trial
dockets are overcrowded. Reversals on meaningless instructions
lead to the conclusion that attorneys cannot or will not draft
proper charges, the courts do not know if they are correct, and
only God could understand them. Pity the poor jurors! There are
more over-instructed than under-instructed juries. Attorneys and
trial judges should strive for a minimum of instructions, and they
should be simple.
7. General and Special Verdicts
The general verdict is composed of three unknown quantities
-the law, the facts, and application of law to facts. It reveals
nothing of the jurors' deliberations and serves no valid purpose
in civil litigation. Judges in trials without a jury are required to
base their decisions on findings of fact and conclusions of law,
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Levy, 68 Fla. 234, 67 So. 47 (1914). In another case
the reviewing court stated that the giving of fifty-two instructions, twenty-nine for
the state and tventy-three for the defendant, was "unreasonable, repetitious and
confusing to the jury." People v. Miller, 403 IMI. 561, 87 N.E.2d 649 (1949).
32 A fairly recent survey revealed that in cases of appeals from jury verdicts,
50% were reversed, and more than one-half of the reversals were due to errors
in instructions. Hulen, Twelve Good Men and True, 38 A.B.A.J. 813, 814 (1952).
19641
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but juries are permitted to conceal their mistakes within the
general verdict. This is paying undue deference to a sacred cow.
Modem rules of procedure which require special verdicts or
general verdicts with answers to written interrogatories provide
the antidote for the procedural opiate-the general verdict.33
When verdicts are contrary to findings of fact, courts can get
true verdicts by requiring juries to change them to conform to
their findings of fact. Thus the common law relic is rectified.
C. Some Evidentiary Problems
1. Medico-Legal Study
It is being conservative to say that seventy per cent or more
of all civil litigations, whether vehicular-derived or not, involves
medical testimony of some kind.34 This testimony will be deter-
minative of damages in most personal injury litigation. It follows
that attorneys must have increased preparation in the large and
overriding field of forensic medicine if legal advocacy is to func-
tion in a properly informed manner. Forensic medicine, medical
jurisprudence, legal medicine and law-science are all generic
terms covering much the same area; that is, correlation and
integration of medicine and allied sciences with law.
This field is now being stressed in law schools, medical schools
and medico-legal institutes. Such emphasis upon interdisciplinary
education between law and medicine is not misplaced. The at-
torney who tries personal injury cases may in one case need
to be conversant with ruptured invertebral discs, while in another
he will be prepared to examine and cross-examine on traumatic
neuroses. Further, the facts of pain and medical rehabilitation
must be considered in relation to damages. These considerations
indicate that attorneys and doctors, as trial participants, have a
mutual interest in personal injury cases. Cooperating intelligently,
the two professions can insure that proper objectives are achieved.
2. Court Appointed Experts
Agitation for court-appointed medical experts in personal
injury actions has had little success. However, impartial expert
witnesses would be very helpful when medical testimony is con-
33 Fed. R. Civ. P. 49. Special verdicts and interrogations.3 4 Polsky, Why Forensio Medicine, Medico-Legal Reader 11 (1956).
[Vol. 52,
PERSONAL INju-Y LrnGATION
flicting, as it is in many cases. Perhaps an expert for the plaintiff
testifies that he is fifty per cent permanently-partially disabled,
while the defendant's expert sees only thirty per cent temporary-
partial disability. How can the jury rationally settle the issue
of disability? It is unfair to require them to do so. One doctor
may testify that a back injury exists and that it is of traumatic
origin in his opinion, while an equally qualified expert may be of
the opinion that the injury is chronic or even non-existent. The
jury may reach a verdict, but it will not resolve this conflict.
Witnesses tend to identify themselves with the party that calls
them. The close association leads them in time to become con-
vinced that the cause they speak for is just. At the trial, they
unconsciously strengthen their testimony to justify their appear-
ance for one side in an adversary proceeding. Then, cross-ex-
amination which questions their motives and qualifications
solidifies their testimony. Medical experts have expressed shock
to find this happening to them in the course of a trial. It is par-
ticularly unfortunate that expert evidence is so presented. With
impartial court-appointed experts for cases in which medical
testimony is in conflict, trial juries would be much less at sea
in their deliberations.
3. Measuring Pain and Suffering
Physical pain and mental suffering are parasitic elements of
damages in that they are products of primary injury from contact,
are immeasurable in dollars, and are expanded out of true pro-
portion by plaintiffs, attorneys and witnesses. 35 Courts agree
that there is no "yardstick" for measuring pain and that jurors
must reach a reasonable figure based upon "sound judgment
and enlightened conscience." One court used this language while
approving a per diem assessment as a "yardstick."' For some
reason, the plaintiff's attorney suggested a per diem of fifteen
dollars per day for pain suffered prior to trial and one dollar per
35 Al pain is mental and centers in the brain. See Hargis v. Knoxville Power
Co., 175 N.C. 31, 94 S.E. 702, 703 (1917). The various forms of mental
suffering are as numberless as the capacities of the human soul for torturing
itself. See Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 158 Cal. 499, 111 P. 534
(1910).3 6R1atner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959). The recovery here was
$198,339 for permanent disability. The injury occur-red 783 days prior to trial.
Life expectancy was 10,220 days. The request for pai ad sufering was: 783
x $15=$11,745.00, and 10,220 x $1=$10,220.00. Perhaps the attorney decided he
could not sell the jury on the formula 10,220 x $15=$153,300.00.
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day for the period of life expectancy. In another jurisdiction the
attorney settled on an in-between figure of five dollars per diem
for pain from a permanent back injury.
The fact that attorneys select per diem rates ranging from
one dollar to fifteen dollars indicates that the procedure lacks
rationality. Figures are simply plucked out of thin air by counsel
to create impressions not based on evidence."
Objections to per diem pay for pain are:
a. It is not based on evidence,
b. Attorneys give evidence in the case,
c. Has no logical relation to the injury, and
d. Juries are misled into assessing exorbitant amounts. 9
While it is difficult to measure pain and suffering, the severity
can be measured. At least, this is true of physical pain. Expert
evidence should be in the record as to whether the plaintiff was
given analgesics for slight pain, sedatives for moderate pain, or
opiates for great pain. Further, proof should be developed on the
extent to which medication for pain was administered in the past
and to what extent this would be necessary in the future. Next,
experts can classify the intensity of pain ranging from an acute
heart attack to the discomfiture of a mild headache. If defense
attorneys develop this proof thoroughly, pain and suffering
awards can be kept within reason.
4. Certain Exclusionary Rules of Evidence
A general attack on restrictive rules of evidence is not pert-
inent to this paper. That expert opinion is too restricted in per-
sonal injury actions is arguable. But the rule that prohibits, in
all states but Alabama, introduction in evidence of authoritative
37 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mattingly, 839 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960). The
appellate court in approving a per diem rate for pain and suffering simply stated
that, since the jury must reach an exact figure, the attorney could suggest an
exact figure.
a Despite the irrationality of per diem pay for pain, the procedure has
substantial sup port. See authorities cited pro and con in Ratner v. Arrington,
111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959).
39 A case in which an eight year old boy was struck by a train and lost his
left leg well illustrates how juries can run wild on pain and suffering. The jury's
verdict assessed damages for loss of earning power at $121,000.00 and $127,489.00
for pain and suffering. Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla.
1955). When damages for pain and suffering exceed compensatory damages,
the sense of values is out of kilter and prejudice is revealed. An oddity of this
case was the fact that the jury made its verdict on the precise amounts argued
for by plaintiff's attorney.
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medical treatises is unsound.40 These books are excluded as
hearsay, but should be admitted as exceptions. They are trust-
worthy since the authors were writing for members of their
profession, and are necessarily impartial to the issues in any
lawsuit. Exclusion may bar the most reliable sources of scientific
medical data from personal injury litigation.
5. Intermediate Fact-Finding Boards
This proposal is in sharp conflict with conventional concepts
of trials as purely adversary. It applies the theory of court ap-
pointed experts to the entire trial. Under the plan, court commis-
sioners would begin action at the time a complaint for personal
injuries was filed. They would take sworn, ex parte statements
from the parties and witnesses. They would make a complete
investigation, including the examination of all physical evidence.
Then, their findings and all data in the case would be filed with
the clerk of the court and be made equally available to the parties.
Such an impartial non-party investigation and report should
have a salutary effect on person injury actions. Prompt action
for the record by impartial investigators while facts are still
fresh in the minds of unrehearsed witnesses is the virtue of the
proposed procedure. In many instances it could be expected to
lead to settlements or voluntary dismissals. If trials were held,
the statements taken by the commissioners could be used for
purposes of impeachment by the parties and the commissioners
would be available as impartial witnesses of the court. Con-
ceivably, in a given case, one party might offer no evidence,
relying solely on the impartial presentation. Again, the parties
might stipulate that the entire case be submitted to the jury
on the testimony of the court's expert witnesses and commission-
ers. This is utopia in personal injury actions, but it is possible
that in the not too distant future adversary presentation of evi-
dence in personal injury cases will be replaced by the sanity
of impartial presentation.
40 "It is the boast of this advancing age of civilization that, aided and
facilitated by the printer's art, the collected learning of past ages has been trans-
mitted to us. Shall we withhold the benefits of this heritage from the contests
of the court room? We think not." Stoudeneier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 588
1857). Halper, Medical Textbooks in the Courtroom, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 252
1955), is authority for the proposition that only Alabama admits medical text-
books in evidence.
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III. CONCLUSION
Trials and trial juries may be the essence of democracy in per-
sonal injury actions, but they have defects and these defects are
remediable in a substantial degree. They are not subject to
a full and complete remedy because trials distort facts through
adversary presentation and jurors are susceptible to passion and
prejudice. Disproportionate awards for pain and suffering and
for punitive damages stand as witnesses on the record to this
point. However, as we must "live" with trials and trial jurors
for the forseeable future, some, if not all, of the remediable
procedures here suggested should be adopted to improve the
disposition of personal injury litigation.
